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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
repudiate its decision in Rosenbioom. This would again result in un--
certainty for both the news media and defamed private individuals.
The significance of the Gertz opinion lies in the Court's repudiation of
the Rosenbloom public or general interest test and in its refusal to extend
the New York Times standard to cases involving private individuals. Con-
sequently, the status of the individual is once again paramount; the public's
interest in a certain issue is of no consequence in determining whether the
Times standard should apply. The definition of a public official as an-
nounced in New Y-ork Times and elaborated in Rosenblatt'0 9 has been
revitalized; a similar result has been obtained with regard to the defini-
tion of a public figure as announced in Butts and elaborated upon in
Greenbelt.n 0 In future cases, the dispute will focus on whether the de-
famed plaintiff is a public official, public figure, or private individual. If
he is a public official or a public figure, the Times standard will still be
applied; if he is a private individual, then the state standard of liability
will be applied. Although in both situations the burden of proof lies with
the plaintiff, the state standard of reasonable care is less rigorous. There-
fore, the plaintiff will be able to'establish culpability more easily than he
would if the actual malice standard had been retained.
While the instant decision is supported by a majority rationale, which
eliminates the uncertainty of Rosenbloom, it is submitted that the true
impact of Gertz will only be realized when the states frame their own
standards for defamation in the area of individuals who are neither public
officials nor public figures. Only when the states have thus responded to
the instant case will. the law of defamation come to rest.
William E. Molchen II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTH AMENDMENT - CONDUCT OF
AN EFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY DEMANDS THAT PRESIDENTIAL POWER
TO CONDUCT ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS PUR-
POSES NOT BE SUBJECTED TO WARRANT REQUIREMENT, AND THAT
SUBSEQUENT JUDICIAL REVIEW BE LIMITED.
United States v. Butenko (3d Cir. 1974)
Appellant Ivanov and his codefendant Butenko were convicted of
conspiracy to oommit espionage for attempting to transmit to a foreign
government information relating to the defense of the United States,' and
109. See note 22 supra.
110. See note 82 supra.
1. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 596 (3d Cir. 1974). Defendants
were convicted of having conspired to violate the provisions of sections 797 and 951
of the federal criminal code. Section 794 proscribes the acts of espionage.
(a) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates,
1974-19751
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unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.2
While petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States
were pending, the Government voluntarily revealed that it had conducted
electronic surveillance in which certain conversations of Ivanov had been
intercepted.8 The Supreme Court, having granted certiorari, 4 held that
the records of the illegal surveillance must be disclosed to the defendant,
and remanded the case for a determination of the legality of the surveillance
under the fourth amendment and for findings of whether, if illegal, the
surveillance had tainted the convictions.5
Upon remand, the district court, following an in camera viewing of the
surveillance records, found that the challenged set0 of warrantless inter-
ceptions, which had been expressly authorized by the Attorney Gen-
eral,7 violated neither section 605 of the Communications Act of 19348 nor
the fourth amendment. 9 On appeal, the Third Circuit, sitting en banc10
delivers, or transmits, or attempts to communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any
foreign government ... either directly or indirectly, any . . . information relating
to the national defense, shall be punished ....
(c) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section, and one or more
of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the
parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment provided for the
offense which is the object of such conspiracy.
18 U.S.C. § 794(a), (c) (1970).
Section 951 requires all nonemissary foreign agents to register with the
Secretary of State.
Whoever, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or attach6, acts in the
United States as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to
the Secretary of State, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned ....
Id. § 951 (1970).
2. United States v. Butenko, 384 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1967), vacated in part and
remanded sub. nom., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). The Third
Circuit, however, directed an acquittal of Ivanov under the section 951 count. Id.
3. 494 F.2d at 596.
4. 392 U.S. 923 (1968). The Court's decision to grant certiorari was prompted
by this Government disclosure, and the grant was limited to questions of standing and
the Government's duty to disclose the records of illegal surveillances. Id. at 923-24.
5. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
6. The Government had conceded that another set of interceptions was illegal.
See Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310, 313 n.1 (1969). However, this was
held not to have tainted the conviction. United States v. Ivanov, 342 F. Supp. 928
(D.N.J. 1972). This surveillance apparently had not been approved by the Attorney
General. Id. at 932 n.2. See note 66 infra.
7. See United States v. Butenko, 318 F. Supp. 66, 70 (D.N.J. 1970).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970).
9. 318 F. Supp. at 71-73. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The appellant had contended that the warrantless search violated his fourth
amendment rights. 318 F. Supp. at 71-72. The court, however, adopted the Govern-
ment's position that the President, acting through the Attorney General in the exercise
of his constitutional power to conduct the nation's foreign policy, could lawfully
authorize warrantless electronic surveillance for the purpose of gathering foreign
884 [VOL. 20
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affirmed the district court by a five-to-four margin, holding, inter alia, that,
while the fourth amendment is applicable to the executive's foreign affairs
power, that 'amendment does not, in light of the compelling governmental
need to gather foreign intelligence, require the executive to obtain a warrant
prior to conducting electronic surveillance to secure foreign intelligence
information since the opportunity for post-surveillance judicial review ade-
quately safeguards fourth amendment rights. United States v. Butenko, 494
F.2d 593 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
Butenko involved two issues which have historically received markedly
different treatment by the courts. While the executive branch has always
been subject to rigorous judicial scrutiny when it employs electronic sur-
veillance, the courts have accorded it great latitude in its activities in the
field of foreign affairs.
The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized that the
President has the power to hire agents to obtain intelligence information,
this power being derived from his authority as Commander in Chief.
1" The
Court has stated that this intelligence gathering power is a necessary ad-
junct to the authority of the Executive, the "sole organ of the federal gov-
ernment in the field of international relations. 1 2 Its willingness to
recognize broad presidential authority over foreign policy has made it
unwilling to scrutinize the exercise of this authority. The Court has ex-
plicitly stated its policy as follows:
The conduct of foreign relations was committed by the Constitution
to the political departments of the government, and the propriety of
what may be done in the exercise of this political power was not sub-
ject to judicial inquiry or decision.'"
intelligence information necessary to the national security. 318 F. Supp. at 70-71.
See text accompanying notes 11 & 12 infra.
10. 494 F.2d at 596. At the first hearing, the Third Circuit had unanimously
affirmed the district court's finding that the concededly illegal interceptions had
not tainted the convictions (see note 6 supra), but held by a two-to-one vote that
the set of interceptions in issue in the instant case had been made in violation
of section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964), as amended,
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970). 494 F.2d at 597. The panel remanded the case to the district
court for the Government's disclosure to Ivanov of the records of this set of inter-
ceptions so that an evidentiary hearing might be held to determine whether or not
they had prejudiced his conviction. Id. The Government petitioned the court for a
rehearing en banc of that portion of the decision which had ordered this disclosure
and hearing; the court granted this petition. Id.
11. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875). The Constitution provides
in part: "[Tlhe President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
12. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
13. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328 (1937), citing Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). The Supreme Court discussed the issue of whether
cases involving foreign affairs are political questions, and thus not justiciable, in Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (dictum). The Court there stated that while foreign
relations cases are frequently political questions, not every case relating to foreign
affairs was a fortiori not justiciable, but that each case should be evaluated separately
in terms of its historical management by the political, departments, the existence of
standards to aid in its judicial decision, and whether or not a decision upon the issue
has already been made by the political departments. Id. at 211-12. The cases cited
1974-1975]
3
Cuker: Constitutional Law - Fourth Amendment - Conduct of an Effective F
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1975
VLLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The Court has buttressed this policy by stating that intelligent review of
the executive branch's fQreign policy actions cannot be conducted unless
the Court has access to the secret intelligence information upon which the
executive actions are based, and by explicitly holding that it does not con-
sider itself privy to such secret intelligence data.1
4
The Court's reluctance to compel disclosure of this information un-
doubtedly has stemmed from its policy of protecting the secrecy of the
Executive's intelligence !gathering efforts. 15 The Court has held that
information about intelligence operations "must never be disclosed" in court
because such a disclosure "might compromise or embarrass our govern-
ment in its public duties . . ." and thus entail a detriment to the public.1 6
It has prohibited disclosure even when the result of this prohibition has
been to prevent the judiciary from enforcing a strong policy of its own.'
7
Despite its deference to the executive branch, the Court has con-
sistently maintained that ,the foreign affairs power "must be exercised
in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution,' 8 in-
cluding the restrictions imposed by the Bill of Rights. 19
In marked contrast to the area of foreign affairs, executive authoriza-
tion of electronic surveillance has always been subjected to close judicial
scrutiny. Section 605 of the Communications Act of 193420 prohibited the
by the Court indicate that except for those arising under the supremacy clause, cases
relating to foreign affairs have been deemed' justiciable only when no conclusive action
has been taken upon them by another governmental branch, or when the Court's task
was to determine the applicability of federal statutes to American activity abroad.
Id. at 212-13. The Court has never reviewed the legality of a foreign affairs decision
made by a President. See id. at 211-13.
14. Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
In that case, the Court was asked to review a presidential refusal to grant an overseas
air route. Id. at 105. The decision upon the route involved questions of national
defense and foreign relations. Id. at 108. The reasons given for the President's
refusal to grant the route were quite vague, the Civil Aeronautics Board saying only
that he had made his decision "because of certain factors relating to our broad
national welfare and other matters for which the Chief Executive has special respon-
sibility." Id. at 111, quoting Latin American Air Serv., 6 C.A.B. 857, 860 (1946).
Nonetheless, the Court declined to review the decision. 333 U.S. at 109-11.
15. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
16. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106-07 (1875).
17. See id. at 107. In the Totten case, a spy who had never been paid for the
services he had rendered the Union during the Civil War had his suit dismissed due
to the Court's fear that it would entail disclosure of intelligence operations, even
though the war had ended, and dismissal was clearly contrary to the strong judicial
policy against unjust enrichment. See id. at 106-07.
18. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
19. Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
20. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970). The Act reads
in relevant part:
[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communica-
tion and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person ....
Id.
The Supreme Court held that this ban of wiretapping applied to federal
agents investigating domestic crime, and that neither evidence obtained in violation of
[VOL. 20
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interception and divulgence of communications by any person without the
consent of the sender. This statutory rule was supplemented by a consti-
tutional mandate when the Supreme Court held that the use of electronic
devices to intercept conversations constituted a "search" within the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment. 21 Shortly thereafter, Congress passed title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196822 (Crime
Control Act), which permitted federal agents to conduct electronic sur-
veillance in certain instances,23 but contained restraints upon them con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's decision.24 Congress itself noted, how-
ever, that "[l] imitations that may be deemed proper in the field of
domestic affairs of a nation become artificial when international relations
and internal security are at stake,"25 and surveillance in these areas was,
therefore, exempted from the Act's requirements, as well as from the re-
strictions of the Communications Act of 1934.26
the statute nor the "fruits" thereof could be utilized in court. Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) ; Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937).
President Roosevelt agreed with these decisions, but believed that they still permitted
electronic surveillance for internal security and foreign affairs purposes, and ordered
such surveillance to continue. Confidential Memorandum from President Roosevevlt
to Attorney General Jackson, May 21, 1940, quoted in United States v. Smith, 321
F. Supp. 424, 430-31 (C.D. Cal. 1971). See United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 310-11 n.10 (1972). Surveillance for foreign affairs purposes
has been carried on continuously from the date of this memorandum. United States
v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 624 (3d Cir. 1974) (Aldisert, J., dissenting in part).
21. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51, 54-60 (1967). Because electronic
eavesdropping constituted a search, the Court held that a state statute which failed
to subject it to the same degree of strict judicial scrutiny as was constitutionally
required for other types of searches was unconstitutional. Id; Nontrespassory sur-
veillances were held to constitute "searches" in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
22. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21 (1970).
23. Id. § 2516.
24. Compare id. § 2518 with Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51, 54-60 (1967).
The Crime Control Act primarly requires the Attorney General or his designate to
apply for a warrant, which will be granted only if there is probable cause to believe
that 1) the target of the surveillance will commit or has committed one of a specified
list of offenses; 2) information about this offense will be obtained through interception
of communications; 3) such interception is the only feasible means of investigation;
and 4) the place where the interception is to be made is used, or is about to be used,
by the target of the surveillance. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970).
25. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1968).
26. The Crime Control Act provides in part:
(3) Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications
Act of 1934 . . . shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take
such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or
potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign in-
telligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or
to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect
the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other
unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the structure
or existence of the Government. The contents of any wire or oral communica-
tion intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise of the foregoing
powers may be received in evidence in any trial hearing, or other proceeding
1974-19751
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Since the Crime Control Act did not require a warrant for domestic
security surveillance, the Supreme Court, in United States v. United States
District Court,27 had to decide whether the fourth amendment imposed this
requirement. The Court held that the presidential power to protect national
security was subject to the fourth amendment and its warrant requirement
because such surveillance posed a danger both to freedom of expression
and freedom from unreasonable invasion of privacy.28 The Government's
interest in its ability to operate more efficiently without these restrictions
was not considered strong enough to outweigh these dangers.2 9 At the
same time, the Court emphasized that it expressed no opinion whatsoever
as to the constitutionality of warrantless surveillance conducted for foreign
affairs purposes.
3 0
Since foreign surveillance occurs with much greater frequency than
domestic surveillance, 81 and consequently may present a greater threat to
fourth amendment rights, the question Butenko presented had added
significance.
After initially concluding that section 605 of the Communications Act
of 193432 did not apply to wiretaps employed for foreign intelligence pur-
poses,3 3 the Third Circuit focused upon the issues of whether, and to what
extent, the fourth amendment limited foreign surveillance activities.
3 4
only where such interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or
disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power.
Crime Control Act § 2511(3), 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970).
27. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
28. Id. at 313.
29. Id. at 317-18, 320-23. The Court held the government interest insufficient
because it believed judges were capable of dealing with complex domestic security
issues, and because it believed judges could take adequate steps to assure security at the
ex parte warrant hearing. Id. at 320-21. This rationale appears to run contrary to
precedents in the foreign affairs area. See text accompanying notes 13, 16 & 17 supra.
30. 407 U.S. at 308, 321-22. The Court stated that "foreign surveillance" was
surveillance directed at the "'activities of foreign powers, within or without this
country,'" while "domestic surveillance" was surveillance "'deemed necessary to
protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the
existing structure of Government.'" Id. at 308-09, quoting the affidavit of Attorney
General Mitchell (emphasis supplied by the Court).
31. Note, Foreign Security Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 87 HARv.
L. REv. 976, 993 n.67 (1974).
32. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964), as amended 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970). See note 20
supra.
33. 494 F.2d at 598-602. The court noted that if section 605 were interpreted to
be a congressional proscription of such taps, it would raise a possible issue of uncon-
stitutional congressional restriction of presidential authority to conduct foreign policy.
Id. at 601. The dissenting opinions filed by Chief Judge Seitz, joined in by Judge
Van Dusen and joined in part by Judge Aldisert, 494 F.2d at 608-15, Judge Aldisert,
joined by Judge Van Dusen, id. at 620-26, and Judge Gibbons, id. at 626-34,
strongly disagreed with the majority's interpretation of section 605. In fact, this was
the primary issue which divided the court, as the dissenters viewed the foreign sur-
veillance under question as violative of § 605, and therefore, except for Judge Gibbons,
did not consider the fourth amendment issue. Id.
The importance of section 605 was greatly diminished by the passage of the
Crime Control Act. See notes 25 & 26 and the accompanying text supra.
34. 494 F.2d at 602.
[VOL. 20
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The court acknowledged that foreign threats to national security are
of "immeasurable gravity," but found nothing either in the President's
powers enumerated in article II or in the balance of the Constitution to
justify exempting the conduct of foreign affairs, including foreign sur-
veillance, from the protection of the fourth amendment.85
The court noted that under the fourth amendment all searches must
be "reasonable" - supported by probable cause - and that even a reason-
able search may be unlawful if made without a warrant.36 It then proceeded
to analyze the instant case in light of these two requirements.3 7 The court
first recognized that the warrant requirement may be excused when specific
and exigent factual circumstances are present, 38 or when a strong public
interest is involved.8 9 In the instant case, the court decided that the public
interest in a continuous flow of information to the executive branch40 justi-
fied another exception to the warrant requirement when surveillance
stemmed from a need for foreign affairs intelligence. 4 1 In light of the
need for the President to act secretly and quickly to investigate espionage,
and his frequent inability to anticipate the need to conduct electronic sur-
veillance in doing so,42 the court concluded that a requirement that federal
agents obtain judicial approval prior to conducting such surveillance would
seriously interfere with the effectiveness of their operations.43 Although it
conceded that if the warrant requirement were applicable, traditional fourth
amendment analysis would nonetheless excuse warrantless surveillance
when the exigencies were truly pressing, the court believed that federal
agents could be expected neither to distinguish exigent from nonexigent
situations, nor to rush to magistrates in the latter cases. 4 The court em-
phasized that subsequent judicial review would provide an adequate deter-
rent to executive abuse of the warrant exemption. 4 It expected opportun-
ities for such review to arise primarly through motions to suppress evidence
in criminal cases, and, occasionally in civil suits for violation of individual
35. Id. at 603. The court stated that this conclusion logically followed from
District Court, which had held that presidential power to protect internal security
was subordinate to the fourth amendment. Id.
36. Id. at 604.
37. Id.
38. Id. Such situations include searches of an automobile where there is inade-
quate opportunity to obtain a warrant, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925) ; "frisks" of persons stopped for questioning, if they are reasonably believed
to be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ; and searches incident
to lawful arrests, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 494 F.2d at 604.
39. 494 F.2d at 605. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), cited by the court
as authority for this statement, involved the applicability of the warrant requirement
to home visits by welfare workers. Id. at 310, 317-18. See text accompanying notes
57-60 infra.





45. Id. at 606.
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rights.46 The occasion for review having arisen in the instant case, the
legality of the warrantless surveillance was tested against a modified
standard of probable cause,47 because the governmental interest which com-
pelled the intrusion was based upon something other than a belief that
criminal activity would be uncovered.48  The Third Circuit held that the
fourth amendment would be satisfied if the primary purpose of the sur-
veillance was to secure foreign intelligence information, and that any
accumulation of evidence of criminal activity must be purely incidental,4 9
so that the foreign intelligence label would not be used as a cloak for
domestic political or criminal surveillance.50 In light of the district court's
finding that the surveillance had been conducted solely for the purpose of
obtaining foreign intelligence information, 51 the Third Circuit held the
surveillance was constitutional.r 2
It was undoubtedly proper for the court to give such heavy weight to
the needs of the Executive in this case. Unlike most fourth amendment
cases, which involve balancing an individual's right to privacy against
society's right to protection from suspected criminal activity, this case in-
volved governmental interests of greater scope. Restricting the President's
surveillance power could endanger the national security and jeopardize the
effectiveness of the nation's foreign policy, with a substantial adverse im-
pact upon the lives of all citizens. While these considerations were present
in District Court, they were overshadowed by the danger to freedom of
expression present there.58
46. Id. at 605-06 & n.52. See notes 70 & 71 and accompanying text infra.
47. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
48. 494 F.2d at 606.
49. Id. at 605.
50. Id. Outside of this caveat, the court did not precisely define the scope of
the term "foreign intelligence purposes.,,
51. 318 F. Supp. at 70.
52. 494 F.2d at 606. Since disclosure of surveillances not yet held to be illegal
need only be ordered if it would substantially promote a more accurate resolution of
the issue raised by the surveillance, the court also held that the trial judge had not
abused his discretion by refusing to order disclosure of the records of the wiretaps.
Id. at 607. The court reasoned that since the appellant had conceded that these sur-
veillances had been conducted solely to gather foreign intelligence information, dis-
closure of the records of the wiretaps could not further illuminate the resolution of
the legal issue presented. It thus concluded that the need for secrecy of information
as sensitive as that involved in this case made an in camera examination a proper
alternative to full disclosure and an adversary proceeding upon legality. Id. The
majority never indicated whether the fact that appellant was a Soviet, and not an
American citizen, was a factor in its decision. Appellant had argued that the fourth
amendment protects aliens as well as citizens. Id. at 617-18 (Aldisert, J., dissenting
in part). See Au Yi Lau v. Imm. & Natur. Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 223 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971) (aliens protected by fourth amendment). See also
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (classifications based upon alienage held
suspect) ; Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 & n.5 (1953) (aliens pro-
tected by fifth amendment).
53. This is because District Court involved domestic security surveillance; sur-
veillance within the penumbra of that vague phrase has historically been used by other
governments, and could easily be used by this government against outspoken political
dissidents. 407 U.S. at 320. While this problem is not entirely absent from the for-
[VOL. 20
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However justified the court may have been in granting substantial
weight to these interests, it is submitted that in doing so, the court failed
to give full consideration to traditional judicial rules created to assure
maximum protection of fourth amendment rights. The Third Circuit
stated that the warrant requirement should be excused only in response
to a specific and critical fact situation,54 but the broad scope of the
exemption granted in the instant case arguably did not meet these criteria.
The exemption encompasses all foreign intelligence surveillance and applies
even if the information sought is not vital to national security. The ex-
emption also applies if the agents had ample time to obtain a warrant,55
if the need for secrecy is not overwhelming, and even if the small risk of a
security leak involved in an ex parte hearing 6 should have been taken.
This sweeping exception does not follow from the strong public interest
involved. The court's authority for excusing the requirement in defer-
ence to such an interest was Wyman v. James,57 where the Supreme Court
refused to apply the fourth amendment warrant requirement to home visits
by welfare workers. However, the Court in Wyman held that the intrusion
in that case had not constituted a "search" within the meaning of the
fourth amendment, and only for the purpose of argument did it assume
the contrary, holding the intrusion reasonable in any event.58 Second, in
its discussion of reasonableness, the Wyman Court emphasized the limited
nature of the intrusion involved in a visit made at a reasonable time of
the day with several days advance notice having been given,59 noting that
the visits served not only the public interest but the interest of the person
visited as well. 0 Electronic surveillance, on the other hand, is an ex-
tremely broad intrusion, since all conversations of an unsuspecting indi-
vidual, regardless of their relevance to the alleged illegal activity, 61 are
monitored for a considerable period of time, serving only governmental
interests.
It is normally the judiciary's role to scrutinize such serious invasions of
individual privacy. However, in the instant case, this role conflicted with
the judiciary's concomitant duty to exercise restraint in its review of
executive decisions concerning foreign affairs. Although faced with having
to choose which role to follow, the court did not expressly weigh the
eign surveillance area (see notes 71, 90 & 91 and accompanying text infra), use of
the surveillance power against domestic political dissenters would be much more
difficult to justify in terms of external threats to security.
54. See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
55. 494 F.2d at 637 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons, in his dissenting
opinion, criticized the majority's failure to consider this factor and the element of
presence or absence of a special need for secrecy in determining whether the warrant
requirement should be excused in the instant case. Id.
56. The Supreme Court in District Court noted that security risks would not be
as great at the ex parte warrant hearing. 407 U.S. at 320-21. See note 29 supra.
57. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
58. 400 U.S. at 318.
59. Id. at 320-21.
60. Id. at 319-20.
61. United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 429 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 9
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competing interests supporting each one. Its final holding 2 clearly implied
that it chose the role of judicial restraint; yet its failure to express this
choice and the reasons for it is puzzling.
The court seemed to rest its decision upon the inconveniences involved
in applying the warrant requirement to foreign intelligence surveillance.
0 3
However, these inconveniences might not be as great as the court perceived
them to be. The court admitted that under traditional analysis, the warrant
requirement, even if originally applicable, could be relaxed for exigent
circumstances in the area of foreign surveillance.0 4 As Judge Gibbons'
dissent noted, the test for determining whether such sufficient exigencies
are present could be altered to meet the specific problems which arise in this
area by considering the unusually important governmental interest involved
and the frequent unforeseeability of the need for foreign intelligence sur-
veillance.65 The court's analysis ignored the fact that, as a necessary ad-
junct to the protection of fourth amendment rights, the courts have tra-
ditionally required government officials to distinguish "exigent" from
"nonexigent" circumstances, and to always obtain judicial approval in the
latter cases. 66 It should also be noted that since the planning and execution
of electronic surveillance usually requires some time, a warrant application
could be made during the planning period.67 Finally, problems of time and
security could be minimized by directing all applications to a centralized
62. See text accompanying notes 43 & 49 supra.
63. See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
64. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
65. 494 F.2d at 636 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
66. E.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64-66 (1968) ; Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 68 (1967) ; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) ; Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,
455-56 (1948) ; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
Additionally, the Government only argued in favor of having the Attorney
General, acting as the President's agent, authorize foreign surveillance without prior
judicial approval. See note 9 supra. Indeed, in nearly all of the previous cases in
which this issue had arisen, the surveillance had been authorized by the Attorney
General. See United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165, 166 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on
other grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 363 F. Supp. 936, 938-42
(D.D.C. 1973), rev'd and remanded, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ; United States v.
Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504, 506 (D.D.C. 1971); United States v. Brown, 317 F.
Supp. 531, 535 (E.D. La. 1970) ; United States v. Stone, 305 F. Supp. 75, 78 (D.D.C.
1969). In the only case in which the surveillance had not been authorized by the
Attorney General, the Government conceded it to have been conducted illegally.
Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310, 313 n.1 (1969). See note 6 supra. In spite
of this, the court's language in Butenko indicated that it assumed that decisions to
conduct a surveillance would be left to officers of lower rank:
Certainly occasions arise when officers acting under the President's authority
are seeking foreign intelligence information, where exigent circumstances would
excuse a warrant. To demand that such officers be so sensitive to the nuances
of complex situations that they must interrupt their activities and rush to the near-
est available magistrate to seek a warrant would seriously fetter the Executive ....
494 F.2d at 605.
If the court actually made this assumption, it was not justified by the record.
If it did not, it is submitted that a demand that the Attorney General of the United
States be "sensitive to the nuances of complex situations" is not unreasonable.
67. Note, supra note 31, at 981.
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court dealing only in this area, all employees thereof having security
clearance. 68
The court's argument that judicial sanctions imposed via post-invasion
review would deter abuse of the warrant exemption6 9 is not convincing.
Civil suits were mentioned as a possible sanction for violation of fourth
amendment rights,70 but the problem with relying upon this as a deterrent
is that since the subject of electronic surveillance is nearly always unaware
of the existence of such surveillance, he seldom becomes aware of any
possible violation of his constitutional rights. Even in the event that the
subject subsequently learns of the surveillance, it would seem unlikely that
one would want to call attention to himself by filing a civil suit.7 1
The deterrent effect of the judicial sanction in criminal cases in which
electronic surveillance has been unlawfully used seems to be greater than
that represented by civil suits. Once the surveillance was determined
to have been illegal, the records would have to be disclosed to the defendant,
and, if it were later determined that any of the evidence to be offered at
trial were the fruit of such surveillance, that evidence would be excluded. 72
The disclosure requirement is particularly severe, because it would force
the government to detail its surveillance operations to its adversaries, re-
gardless of whether the illegal surveillance actually tainted the govern-
ment's case or even had any relation to the prosecution at hand. 73 How-
ever, the fact that these sanctions arise only in criminal cases sharply
diminishes their effectiveness as a deterrent, since most surveillance in the
foreign affairs area is aimed at intelligence gathering rather than criminal
prosecution.
7 4
Despite clear precedent that only objective probable cause, and not
subjective good faith, will satisfy the requirement of "reasonableness," 7r
68. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 323 (1972);
494 F.2d at 636 (Gibbons, J., dissenting in part).
69. See text accompanying notes 45 & 46 supra.
70. 494 F.2d at 600 n.23. Such suits have been permitted since the ruling of
the Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
71. Suits would be more likely to arise if abuse were flagrant, or if the subject of
surveillance is an outspoken political organization. See, e.g., Zweibon v. Mitchell, 363
F. Supp. 936, 938-42 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd and remanded, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.
1975), (member of Jewish Defense League who were subjected to surveillance because
of their anti-Soviet activities sued the Attorney General, who had ordered the
surveillance).
72. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
73. Developments in the Law - The National Security Interest and Civil Liber-
ties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1254 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL SECURITY].
74. It should be noted, however, that taps for foreign intelligence purposes have
had an unusual propensity for incidentally intercepting conversations of persons later
subjected to criminal prosecutions. Despite the fact that the prosecutions have been
unrelated to the taps and untainted by them, the disclosure sanction became available.
See, e.g., United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds,
403 U.S. 698 (1971). The Government's awareness of the possible occurrence of this
undersirable result could have an additional deterrent effect. Note, supra note 31, at 989.
75. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,97 (1964).
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the instant opinion implied that the good faith belief of the agent that
he could obtain foreign intelligence information would suffice, if that were
his primary purpose. 76 The court reached this result in spite of the fact
that the rationale behind the standard of objective probable cause clearly
extends to the area of foreign surveillance: "If subjective good faith alone
were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate,
and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects'
only in the discretion of [government officers] .,,7
By emphasizing that its own standard will effectively prohibit war-
rantless surveillance undertaken primarily for investigating domestic crim-
inal and political activities,78 the court implicitly assumed that this type
of "bad faith" abuse is one which predominates. However, traditionally,
the greatest abuse in the fourth amendment area has come from over-
zealous agents invading the privacy of others in good faith but without ob-
jective probable cause.79 In addition, the court ignored the fact that gov-
ernment agents acting in good faith have shown a tendency to enlarge
permissible invasions beyond their otherwise justifiable scopes.80 This is
another type of abuse against which the court's standard of judicial review
will provide no protection.8'
It would appear that the most convincing reason for the relaxation of
traditional fourth amendment safeguards in this area is that the concept
of judicial incompetence in evaluating foreign policy considerations forbids
anything more stringent. Requiring the judiciary to consider factors which
judges must always evaluate in domestic criminal cases 2 would necessitate a
76. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
77. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964), quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV. One
can easily imagine how the pressure to obtain important foreign intelligence informa-
tion would influence the executive to overlook the evils of invading privacy, and,
instead, order electronic surveillance even when the possibility that the surveillance
would uncover the necessary information was slim. See United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
78. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
79. The following are examples of cases in which official conduct appeared to be
in good faith, but was held illegal because of insufficient justification: Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 412-14 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64-66
(1968) ; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964) ; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98, 102-04 (1959) ; State v. Elkins, 245 Ore. 279, 281-84, 422 P.2d 250, 252-54 (1966).
80. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 445-48, 469-71 (1971) ;
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 753-55 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 64-66 (1968) ; State v. Elkins, 245 Ore. 279, 280-83, 422 P.2d 250, 252-54 (1966).
See also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57-61 (1967).
81. Yet, if one could assume that it is the "bad faith" abuse which predominates
in the cases which the court would encounter in the area of foreign surveillance, the
court's test would prove adequate to protect individual rights most of the time,
assuming also that one could rebut an agent's protestations of good faith. In support of
such an assumption, one could argue that foreign surveillance undertaken in good
faith will rarely uncover evidence of purely domestic crimes (but see note 74 supra),
and civil suits would only be brought following flagrant violations which result
from "bad faith."
82. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Crime Control Act § 2518,
IR U.S.C. § 2518 (1970). These factors include the likelihood that the surveillance
will uncover the desired information, the importance of the information, the possi-
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judicial evaluation of, at least to some degree, the foreign policy needs of the
United States, the nature of the intelligence activities of other countries, and
the nature of sources of foreign intelligence information.8 3 These are areas in
which a judicial inquiry has always been avoided, because it was thought
to be beyond judicial power to make one.8 4 By contrast, executive evalua-
tion of these areas has been an accomplished fact for 200 years, and the
resulting expertise should receive judicial deference. Thus, once a court
were to determine that the primary purpose of the surveillance was to gather
foreign intelligence, its inquiry would be at an end, as any further scrutiny
would be beyond the limits of judicial power and competence.
If the Third Circuit's reason for imposing a relaxed standard of
review was its awareness of its own incompetence to conduct a stricter
one, perhaps a reason for its refusal to apply the warrant requirement was
its recognition of its own impotence as a mechanism for the enforcement
of that requirement. Because the judicial sanctions used to prevent abuse
arise only in civil suits and criminal cases, and are -of a limited scope,85 it
is conceivable that even had the court applied the warrant requirement to
foreign surveillance, the Executive might freely have violated that rulingN,
and continued to order surveillance entirely upon its own, knowing that in
the great majority of cases its violations would never be subjected to
judicial review. If this be true, the practical effect of the court's failure
to adopt the warrant requirement is slight. Yet the possibility of the
revelation of such conduct, giving rise to potent political sanctions (for
example, a strong adverse reaction from the electorate and its representa-
tives), would act as a formidable deterrent ;87 therefore, the practical effect
of this decision would be to eliminate the potential political sanction, leav-
ing only the enforcement of the weaker legal standard suggested by the
court.88
bility that the information could be obtained without electronic surveillance, see Note,
supra note 31, at 997, the possible excuse of a warrant application by the specific
exigencies of a case (see text accompanying note 64 supra), and the proper scope of
the surveillance. 494 F.2d at 636 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) ; Note, supra note 31, at 997.
83. The exact factors would vary in each case, depending upon whether the sur-
veillance was designed to obtain information about other nations or merely to detect
and frustrate foreign espionage activities directed against the United States. Either situ-
ation would involve an evaluation of factors outside of the traditional judicial function.
84. See notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text supra.
85. See text accompanying notes 69-74 supra.
86. See 494 F.2d at 636 (Gibbons, J., dissenting in part) ; National Security,
supra note 73, at 1260; Note, supra note 31, at 989.
87. Note, supra note 31, at 989-90. There can be little doubt that if Congress
and the public were to learn that the Executive had been deliberately and systematically
violating the constitutional rights of individuals (as those rights would be defined by
a more stringent test of the legality of foreign intelligence surveillances), the public
outcry would be great, political embarassment severe, the President's chances for
reelection damaged, the fortunes of his political party harmed, and, possibly, con-
gressional investigations initiated. See NEWSWEEK, Aug. 12, 1974 at 24-27, 29.
88. Another possible reason for the court's decision may be a concern that a
contrary holding might constitute a judicial "foot in the door" leading to greater
judicial review of executive decisions upon other foreign policy questions where
1974-1975]
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A further difficulty with Butenko involves the failure of the court to
set the parameters of its decision by defining the phrase "foreign intelli-
gence purposes."8' 9 The vagueness of this phrase lends itself to expansive
construction and could lead to judicially condoned surveillance of indi-
viduals and organizations which have only a tangential relationship to
the conduct of foreign affairs. 0 The court did not indicate how substantial
the relationship must be to justify the "foreign surveillance" label and
exemption from the warrant requirement.91 Future courts will thus have
to shape the definition of the phrase on a case-by-case basis. However,
since the facts surrounding the surveillance must almost always be kept
secret and the determination of legality made in camera,9 2 the judicial
opinion upon whether the "primary purpose" test is met must go un-
supported by the expression of specific facts and justifications, and no real
body of case law will result.9 3 The court, therefore, should have defined
"foreign intelligence purposes," although it may have been technically un-
necessary to the decision, so that the Third Circuit courts might have an
acknowledged, uniform standard to apply.9
4
The court stated that it was attempting to strike a balance between
the federal government's need to accumulate foreign intelligence and the
people's right to privacy. 95 By striking this balance in favor of the Govern-
ment, the court showed a willingness to relinquish to a significant degree
its role as guarantor of individual rights in order to allow the President
to maintain his traditionally free hand in the field of foreign affairs.
Mark R. Cuker
precedents do not clearly forbid it. While it might be argued that the court erred
in the other direction by opening a gap in the protection of individual rights, the ex-
ception to the warrant requirement created in the instant decision can never be
expanded, because it is limited by statute and judicial precedent which require prior
judicial approval of all other electronic surveillance. See notes 21-24 and accom-
panying text supra. The area to which the exception is restricted is quite narrow;
in 1972, at the time of the District Court decision, there were only 27 foreign intelli-
gence surveillances being conducted in the United States. Note, supra note 31,
at 993 n.67.
89. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
90. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 309 n.8 (1972);
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1968); Note, supra note 31, at 987. In
United States v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1971), the Government argued
that "any attempt to legally distinguish the impact of foreign affairs from matters of
internal subversive activities is an exercise in futility." Id. at 506. The court re-
sponded that "in view of the important individual rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment, any such difficulty ... should be resolved in favor of interposing the
prior warrant requirement." Id. at 506-07.
91. For instance, how would the court classify the tapping of the phones of inter-
national oil companies to gain intelligence on their dealings with the Arab nations?
494 F.2d at 628 (Gibbons, J., dissenting in part). But see 494 F.2d at 603 n.37.
92. See note 52 supra.
93. Note, supra note 31, at 996.
94. Id.
95. 494 F.2d at 596.
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